Published 19 December 05

Beyond the DropZone

W. Thomas Smith Jr.

It takes decades to stand-up an army

On Friday - in the wake of good news regarding voter turnout in the Iraqi elections - UPI reported that U.S. Army General George W. Casey Jr. said, "Iraqi soldiers and police will not be in the lead for security until late 2006 or early 2007." Casey, the commanding general of Multi-National Force-Iraq, added, "When we say in the lead, we mean putting them in charge, still with our transition teams and still with our enabling support."

That's a realistic assessment by a four-star CG who knows. It's a reasonable assertion for those of us who understand these things. Yet it is great fodder-for-spinning by opponents of our efforts in Iraq, because they can continue to argue about the time required to stand-up a totally independently operating Iraqi army.

Last week, during an unrelated phone conversation with Lt. Gen. John Bruce Blount, a retired three-star and former chief of staff of Allied Forces Southern Europe, I made a comment about how so many of those screaming for us to withdraw from Iraq just don't get it. They don't have a grasp of how long it takes to build an army.

General Blount, who also once commanded Fort Jackson, S.C. (the world's largest U.S. Army basic training facility), responded:

"Look, in 1953 President Eisenhower stopped the fighting in Korea, and ordered us to build a South Korean Army.
    I was in the middle of all of that as aide to the commanding general of KMAG [Korean Military Assistance Group]. The South Koreans had an army, but it wasn't a very good one: There were a lot of Chinese NCOs and a very poor officer corps. Discipline was bad. Stealing was rampant. But still it was an army, and it took at least a decade - ten years, from 1953 to 1963 - for the U.S. to stand that army up in such a way that it could defend its country.
    Even then, we stayed with them.
    Iraq is much different. There we are building an army from the ground up as well as a constabulary police system.
    Anyone who thinks we can just build an army in a couple of years and then withdraw, doesn't know what they are talking about."

Of course, Gen. Blount's clearheaded commentary runs counter to the publicly manipulative questions posed by political pundit Bob Beckel during a segment on FOX News' "Hannity & Colmes," which aired on December 6 (and I later addressed at National Review Online's "The Corner."). Beckel said something along the lines of some American soldiers being sent to Iraq with less training than Iraqi soldiers. Then he continued with – and I paraphrase – "How long does it take to train a soldier? We've been training their soldiers for two years."

Fact is, no American soldier is being sent to Iraq with less training than an Iraqi soldier. Period.

That would mean that American soldiers were being sent to Iraq with less than five weeks of training, and that just ain't happening.

Problem is, even though Beckel is flat wrong, his words were uttered on national TV, so now there are untold numbers of those who aren't in the know, but who now actually believe something about our efforts in Iraq that is simply not true. That's not my opinion. That's a fact.

Here are several other factual points to consider:

First: even if a soldier was – in some isolated instance – sent to Iraq straight out of boot camp, his boot camp experience would be nearly twice as long as the basic training an Iraqi soldier receives, in every instance. And Iraqis are often in combat during their basic training.

Second: building an army is not the same things as training soldiers at the individual level. That is only a part of the process. Building an army, as Gen. Blount explained, takes years. And as I've recently reported in a few different venues, it takes about seven to eight years (including college) to mold an American Army officer into an infantry company commander. Fifteen to 17 years for a battalion commander. Twenty to 22 years for a brigade commander. Twenty-five years for a division commander. And though American military officers are honing their skills over the years in real world situations, they also have many opportunities to attend the best professional military leadership schools in the world, and – unlike Iraqi officers – no one is shooting at them while they are in school or threatening the lives of their families because they are officers.

Third: what we are accomplishing in Iraq in terms of standing up the new Iraqi Army from scratch is nothing short of amazing. Sure, it was probably a mistake to disband the old Iraqi army soon after the invasion phase of the war in 2003, but we all understand hindsight, so let's move on.

Fourth: Lets consider the motivations of a private soldier in the Iraqi army: Recently during an interview for National Review Online, Brigadier General Daniel P. Bolger, commanding general of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team in Iraq, told me in so many words that an increasing number of legitimate jobs are being created for young men in Iraq, but many are still volunteering for service in the army and police forces.

Gen. Bolger also told me that a new soldier in the Iraqi Army makes around $300 a month, while the terrorists are offering about $300 per night for anyone willing to plant an IED. Yet Iraqi Army boot camps are turning out around 1,650 brand new soldiers every five weeks. That number is growing weekly, and is slated to double in 2006.

Like the throngs of voters who queued up to the ballot box last week, volunteers who stand in the Iraqi army recruiting lines are not stupid. Nor are they so desperate for work they'll risk death for a loaf of bread.

Why do they do it? Pride, love of country, a sense of duty, and a desire to be on the winning team (and make no mistake, Abu Musab al Zarqawi and his headsmen are not the winning team): All the same reasons American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines have been flocking to the colors post 9/11.

Iraqis also understand, like the old Marine Corps recruiting slogan of the 1980s, "Nobody likes to fight, but somebody has to know how!"

— W. Thomas Smith Jr., a former U.S. Marine infantry leader, parachutist, and shipboard counterterrorism instructor, writes about military/defense issues and has covered conflict in the Balkans and on the West Bank. He is an award-winning author of four books, the co-author of two, and his articles have appeared in USA Today, George, U.S. News & World Report, BusinessWeek, National Review Online, CBS News, The Washington Times, and many others.

W. Thomas Smith Jr. can be reached at wthomassmithjr@yahoo.com.

© 2005 W. Thomas Smith Jr.

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