Published 09 Mar 10
Strategic Interests
by J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.
World Defense Review columnist
Niger Coup: A Blow for Stability and Democracy?
At one o'clock on the afternoon of February 18, Mamadou Tandja, ruler of Niger, sat down to a cabinet meeting during which he planned to announce the withdrawal of his landlocked country from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as the forced retirement of a number of military officers whose loyalty to had begun to be suspect. The latter beat Tandja to the punch and, in less than an hour, he and his chief ministers had been taken effortlessly into custody and a junta styling itself as the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (Conseil supreme pour la restauration de la démocratie, CSRD) was firmly in control of the dusty capital of Niamey. While, by definition, a coup d'état upends constitutional order, given the unique circumstances in Niger, the putschists might indeed fulfill their self-declared objective, and it would certainly be in the interests of the United States and other responsible members of the international community to engage them to that end.
The septuagenarian Tandja, himself a retired army lieutenant colonel, has been a fixture in Nigerien politics since 1974, when he participated in General Seyni Koutché's successful coup against the country's first president, Hamani Diori, and was rewarded with a series of prefectural, ministerial, and diplomatic appointments over the next two decades. By the time that one of Koutché's military successors, Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, was overthrown and killed during the April 1999 coup led by Major Daouda Malam Wanké, Tandja had reinvented himself as a civilian politician. Wanké promised a return to civilian rule within a year and, to the surprise of many, kept his promise, organizing presidential and parliamentary elections barely six months after tossing out the previous uniformed strongman. Tandja won the presidential poll and took office before the year was out. He was subsequently reelected for a second and, according to the Nigerien constitution of 1999, final term in 2004.
Had he bowed out gracefully at the end of his second mandate, Tandja might have been remembered for not just respecting constitutional norms and managing a peaceful transition of power—itself an unprecedented achievement in Niger's five decades of independence—but also his efforts at economically developing one of the poorest countries in the world (the 15 million Nigeriens are ranked at the absolute bottom—182nd place out of 182 countries surveyed—on the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index for 2009). In fact, during his two terms in power, Tandja oversaw the signing of several major deals with European firms to exploit Niger's uranium reserves, the sixth largest in the world, according to the European Nuclear Society. The development of this sector, the president claimed, would provide the impetus for economic growth in the country. Instead, he will go down as yet another African ruler who refused to quit when his time was up. In fact, during the course of his second term, he showed signs of being increasingly out of touch with ordinary Nigeriens, at one point during the country's 2005-2006 food crisis telling a BBC news crew, "the people of Niger look well-fed, as you can see," and dismissing reports of famine as "false propaganda."
The political crisis began in late 2008 when Tandja's supporters, reprising his campaign slogan of "Tazarché!" ("Continuity!" in Hausa), began organizing "spontaneous" demonstrations in Niamey to demand that the presidential term of office be extended. Political opposition and civil society groups soon mobilized counter marches throughout Niger. While Tandja at first disclaimed any connection to the movement to "draft" him, even telling visiting French President Nicolas Sarkozy in March 2009 that "I am ready to leave at the end of my term," less than two months later, he changed his tune to "The people demand that I stay, I cannot ignore their appeal." His spokesman then announced that there would be a referendum before the year's end to adopt a new constitution allowing Tandja to run for a third term. That news brought some 30,000 demonstrators into the streets of Niamey to express their opposition as well as a threat from ECOWAS of sanctions should the referendum go forward since it would break the subregional agreement to respect each member state's constitutional order contained in the organization's 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (article 136 of the Nigerien constitution specifically bars amendments affecting the country's territorial integrity and extending presidential mandates beyond the maximum two five-year terms provided for in the document).
When, at the end of May, the Nigerien Constitutional Court issued an advisory opinion calling the referendum plans illegal, Tandja dissolved the National Assembly. In early June, the president unveiled a plan for a plebiscite, scheduled for August, to give him a three-year extension in office during which time he would elaborate a new constitution for voter approval. The new constitution would shift from a semi-presidential system in which the president and the prime minister share executive power to a presidential system in which the head of state is "the sole holder of executive power." The proposal turned out to be a catalyst, unifying a broad opposition coalition of elder statesmen, political parties, civil society groups, and trade unions that mobilized tens of thousands of their supporters to attend rallies. The Constitutional Court also intervened again, declaring null the presidential decree calling for the referendum. Tandja responded on June 26 by invoking emergency provisions of the constitution which grant the head of state extraordinary powers "when the independence of the nation or national territorial integrity are immediately and seriously threatened and the regular functioning of the constitutional public authorities is interrupted." Three days later, he dissolved the troublesome court, replacing it with a more pliant bench.
Despite widespread international condemnation, Tandja then went ahead with his referendum on August 4, his supporters claiming that 68 percent of the electorate turned out and 92.5 percent of them endorsing the three-year "interim" extension of the presidential mandate. Opposition gatherings were banned and such protesters who dared to gather were dispersed with tear gas. In the lead up to the parliamentary elections subsequently scheduled for October 20, Tandja unleashed a witch hunt against members of the opposition, journalists, and human rights activists, jailing dozens and putting former opposition parliamentarians under surveillance after interrogating some of them. Warrants were issued by the minister of justice for the arrest of former President Mahamane Ousmane, Niger's first democratically elected leader, as well as former Prime Ministers Hama Amadou and Mahamadou Issoufou, all of whom had voiced opposition to Tandja's designs. Not surprisingly, with the hounded opposition boycotting the polls, the vote resulted in a lopsided "victory" for Tandja, his National Movement for the Society of Development (Mouvement National pour la Société du Développement, MNSD) and its allies taking 101 of the 113 seats in the National Assembly (independents won a dozen constituencies, but one of those races was subsequently annulled by the Tandja-appointed oversight tribunal).
The situation reached a stalemate at the end of last year as December 22, the end of Tandja's second and last constitutional term came and went. While tens of thousands of demonstrators continued protests in Niamey, the international community turned on the Tandja regime. The ECOWAS mediation team lead by former Nigerian head of state Abdusalam Abubakar having failed to bring the Nigerien parties to a consensus on resolving the impasse, the subregional body issued a communiqué taking "note of the fact that December 22, 2009, marks the legal end of the mandate of President Mamadou Tandja." The next day, the U.S. State Department put out a statement declaring: "In response to President Tandja's refusal to relinquish his mandate, the United States is suspending its non-humanitarian assistance to the Government of Niger. The Secretary of State has imposed travel restrictions on certain members of the Government of Niger, as well as other individuals who support policies or actions that undermine Niger's return to constitutional rule." On the same day, President Barack Obama signed a proclamation terminating Niger, along with Guinea and Madagascar, from eligibility for trade benefits granted under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), enacted under President Bill Clinton and subsequently expanded under President George W. Bush.
Tandja remained unmoved, however, and went ahead with elections on December 27 for representatives to Niger's 265 municipal councils. With the opposition parties again boycotting the poll to avoid giving legitimacy to a regime that had overstayed its constitutional mandate, the MNSD and its allies won all 3,759 seats being "contested." Increasingly isolated, Tandja took to bribery to shore up support, reportedly handing out government-owned villas and up to 50 million West African CFA francs (approximately $100,000) in cash to senior officers. Unfortunately for him—but perhaps fortunately for Niger—he neglected to tend to the lower military ranks, whose members faced a halving of their salaries since last year's peace with Tuareg rebels in the north meant an end to combat pay.
Thus the stage was set for the storming of the presidential palace last month. The Presidential Guard at the palace (whose members were disproportionately drawn from Tandja's ethnic kin in eastern Niger) was the only unit to put up even minor resistance, and it was quickly overwhelmed by the well-armed and disciplined rebels. The putschists were led by Major Salou Djibou, who commanded a key company based in the southwestern part of the capital. Djibou is widely respected in the Nigerien military as one of the officers who rose through the ranks by merit, rather than political or familial connections. Djibou was backed by a number of well-regarded senior officers, including Colonel Goukoye Abdul Karim, the army chief of doctrine who was noted last year for trying to keep the military out of Tandja's machinations for a third term; Colonel Abdoulaye Adamou Harouna, former commander of the Nigerien peacekeepers with the Mission of the United Nations Organization in Côte d'Ivoire (MONUCI) and onetime aide de camp of Wanké, the military officer who restored democratic rule to Niger in 1999; and Abdoulaye Adamou Harouna's brother, Colonel Djibrilla Hima Harouna, a.k.a. Pelé (he heads the army's soccer league), another Wanké protégé who was serving as commander of the Niamey military district and played a crucial role in securing the capital during the coup. Djibou was quick to announce that no member of the ruling CSRD would be eligible to stand for election in the presidential election which he promised to organize.
Five days after the coup, the military appointed a civilian prime minister, Mahamadou Danda, a political scientist with a doctorate from the University of Bordeaux who has most recently been working as a political counselor at the Canadian Embassy in Niamey. Auspiciously enough, Danda had served as a minister briefly in two previous military regimes, that of Wanké and the earlier government of Ali Seibou, both of which actually honored their pledges to restore democratic rule. Last week, the CSRD junta unveiled a transitional cabinet consisting of just five well-known military officers—taking the portfolios for defense, environment, equipment, sports, and transport—sitting alongside fifteen civilians, including Aminata Djibrilla Maiga, hitherto Nigerien ambassador in Washington, as foreign minister, and Badamassi Anou, a Nigerien economist living in the United States, as finance minister. With the exception of the deposed Tandja and his minister for the interior and public security, Albadé Abouda, who was also secretary-general of the ruling MNSD and is accused of responsibility for last year's crackdown on regime opponents, all those taken prisoner during the coup last month have been released.
The new authorities have been enthusiastically welcomed by Nigeriens and cautiously engaged by the country's international partners, especially when they hastened to pledge a speedy return to constitutional rule and democratic elections. In fact, Niger's new rulers were greeted by outpourings of popular support from their fellow citizens. A spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Niamey even told the New York Times that he had seen "thousands of people and a lot of homemade signs, saying things like 'Long Live the Army' and '100 Percent Support'" and went on the describe the mood on the streets as "festive" and "celebratory." In contrast to the immediate ruptures with the juntas that took power in Mauritania and Guinea in 2008—the former unintentionally creating complications for the fight against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the latter only coming to a resolution of sorts after a botched assassination attempt disabled the head of the junta (see my most recent report on the situation)—U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley took pains to be measured, telling the press that "We do note the public assurances by the Supreme Council for the Restoration for Democracy, for a speedy return of civilian rule to Niger. We support the efforts of ECOWAS, the African Union, and the United Nations to promote Niger's speedy return to the rule of law, and together we will hold Niger to those public pledges."
While its straitened financial circumstances—despite its vast uranium and other mineral wealth, the Nigerien government faces a severe cash crunch—will render the CSRD susceptible to donor pressure to adhere to its pledge to rapidly restore democracy, Niger's international partners need to be careful not to overplay their hand. After all, the country is the least developed on the planet, lagging behind even Afghanistan. Isolating the country would not only adversely affect the welfare of an already vulnerable population, but it would threaten both the fragile peace with the Tuareg nomads in the vast empty spaces of the Nigerien north along the borders with Mali, Algeria, and Libya—the very area where AQIM is active—and the new government's ability to govern the population centers in the south.
Thus the balanced approach outlined by the State Department is probably the right one. While there is always a potential danger that the junta might seek to perpetuate its stay in power, there was already a real threat to constitutional rule in Tandja's subversion of the system to extend his rule. As a number of African pundits have pointed out, the former ruler got what he had coming: the cumulative effect of all the changes he sought, if implemented, would have concentrated unprecedented power in his hands while rendering it nearly impossible to remove him from office (on coups as one way to address bad governance, see the provocative analysis piece by Dalatou Mamane and Rukmini Callimachi of the Associated Press). Moreover, Niger is also a strategic partner of the United States, a charter member of the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), the State Department-funded, Defense Department-supported program designed to enhance border capabilities throughout the region against arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and the movement of transnational terrorists, as well as its successor, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCP), militarily supported by the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS). Having just returned from the region last week, I can attest that, far from being defeated, al-Qaeda's local franchise is transforming itself into a veritable nexus of terrorism and criminal activities and, if anything, gathering strength. This is no time for a prolonged governmental crisis in Niger, the geographic crossroad between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently, the United States, the European Union, and other responsible stakeholders in the international community would do well to continue engaging the authorities in Niamey, supporting the efforts of neighboring countries to facilitate the ongoing political transition in Niger (which ought to include putting Tandja on trial for trying to subvert the country's constitution), and realizing that what the fragile states of the region need most is the stability and good governance that can only come from robust institutions, not all-too-human individuals.
— J. Peter Pham is Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa Project at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in New York City. He also holds academic appointments as Associate Professor of Justice Studies, Political Science, and African Studies at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia, and non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C. He currently serves as Vice President of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA).
Dr. Pham has authored, edited, or translated over a dozen books and is the author of over three hundred essays and reviews on a wide variety of subjects in scholarly and opinion journals on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to the study of terrorism and political violence, his research interests lie at the intersection of international relations, international law, political theory, and ethics, with particular concentrations on the implications for United States foreign policy and African states as well as religion and global politics.
Dr. Pham has testified before the U.S. Congress on numerous occasions and conducted briefings or consulted for the U.S. and foreign governments as well as private firms. He has appeared in various media outlets, including CBS, PBS, CBC, SABC, VOA, CNN, the Fox News Channel, MSNBC, National Public Radio, the BBC, Radio France Internationale, the Associated Press, Reuters, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Washington Times, USA Today, National Journal, Newsweek, The Weekly Standard, New Statesman, and Maclean's, among others.
© 2010 J. Peter Pham
NOTE: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the opinions of World Defense Review and its affiliates. WDR accepts no responsibility whatsoever for the accuracy or inaccuracy of the content of this or any other story published on this website. Copyright and all rights for this story (and all other stories by the author) are held by the author.
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