Published 29 September 05

Walid Phares, Ph.D.
World Defense Review columnist

Debate on al Qaida's losses in Iraq
Newsweek's speedy conclusions lead to analytical crash

An interesting Newsweek story this week – that references CT Blog among its sources – claims scoring a point against what it paints as a "questionable" Bush administration portrayal of Abu Azzam.

In short, the authors of the article, Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball claim the Administration's leaders aggrandized the real importance of the killed al Qaida commander basing their conclusion on a number of non-identified U.S. counter-terrorism officials and a report posted by our colleague Evan Kohlman on the blog. The "charge" by Newsweek is about the hierarchy of the man. Was he or was he not the "number two" of abu Mussab? In fact, the article's real problem is in semantics. Was Abu Azzam number two, deputy commander, a top lieutenant, the second most powerful man, or even a future heir for the organization? What seems to be journalistically a one status are in fact multiple functions with various consequences on the War in Iraq, and different statements made by different people. Isikoff and Hoseball are right to "investigate" the matter, as all experts should do, but their fast conclusion missed crucial nuances, crashing analytically.

In their hurry to score a point against "Bush's War in Iraq" the level of analysis was mixed up ultimately playing in the hands of the Jihadists propaganda as one would forecast in the last paragraph.

The article's real proposition is embodied by this sentence: "Bush seized on the killing of Abu Azzam by joint U.S-Iraqi forces in a shootout last Sunday as fresh evidence that the United States is turning the tide against the Iraqi insurgency."

Let's not argue with the political goal, for if indeed Isikoff and Hoseball can establish that the Bush Administration knew that Abu Azzam wasn't someone important and used the killing to prove the "turning tide" then Newsweek's point is made. Even if the article would prove that the President's team wasn't able to evaluate the Jihadi commander in his real weight, a point will nevertheless be made. But in this case, and until further analysis is developed no one has made a final point, neither the Administration nor Newsweek. 

Here is why: The President, according to Newsweek said "this guy was a brutal killer." He added that Abu Azzam "was one of [Abu Mussab al-] Zarqawi's top lieutenants." And furthermore Bush said he was told the man was "top operational commander of Al Qaeda in Baghdad." He didn't say "deputy commander."

Now, Newsweek's article says, "U.S. intelligence officials and counterterrorism analysts are questioning whether a slain terrorist – described by President Bush today as the "second-most-wanted Al Qaeda leader in Iraq" – was as significant a figure as the Bush administration is claiming."

Then the authors write: "Gen. Richard Myers, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters at the Pentagon that the U.S. military considered Abu Azzam the "No. 2 Al Qaeda operative in Iraq, next to Zarqawi."

Newsweek's article adds: "Three U.S. counterterrorism officials, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the subject, also told Newsweek today that U.S. agencies did not really consider Abu Azzam to be Zarqawi's deputy," even if he did play a relatively high-ranking role in the insurgency.

Let's stop here:
According to Newsweek

1) The President said about Abu Azzam
    a. Brutal killer
    b. One of Zarqawi's top lieutenants
    c. "A top operational commander of Al Qaeda in Baghdad"
    d. "Second-most-wanted Al Qaeda leader in Iraq"
2) General Myers said about Abu Azzam: "No. 2 Al Qaeda operative in Iraq, next to Zarqawi."
3) Per Newsweek, three U.S. counter Terrorism officials (no names were provided) said of Abu Azzam:
    a. He is not as significant a figure as the Bush administration is claiming.
    b. That U.S. agencies did not really consider Abu Azzam to be Zarqawi's "deputy"

An easy comparative analysis shows that both the President and General Myers didn't "say" nor "describe" the al Qaida commander as M.M. Isikoff and Hosenball blamed them for. Bush used the terms of "brutal killer;" "one of Zarqawi's lieutenants;" "top operational commander in Baghdad;" "second most wanted al Qaida leader in Iraq."

Ironically the so-called "secret" U.S. counterterrorism officials (whose statements can't be verified) produced only judgments, not an identification. Newsweek attributed to the "secret sources" that the guy was not a "significant figure" nor did the agencies consider him as "deputy." In synchronic analysis the President said the man is a big shot, and the article quoted "sources" who said Abu Azzam "wasn't the official deputy." Hence, what Newsweek attempted to portray as a misrepresentation by the President of a Terrorist leader, against the so-called "expertise" of agencies is not even an issue: In a sum, I haven't read yet an official release by the White House stating that the man's official title was "deputy commander of Zarqawi (na'ib al Qa'id)." And the sources didn't know better.

Yes, General Myers described him as "No. 2 Al Qaeda operative in Iraq, next to Zarqawi:" Which doesn't either tell us if he is or not the deputy commander, the vice president, the second emir in command, or so.

So, what Newsweek raised was a faux probleme, an irrelevant hypothesis. That Abu Azzam was or not an important cadre is the real issue. But that he was specifically (or not) the actual organic deputy commander under Zarqawi, neither the Administration can establish that nor the article was able to establish how al Qaida function in Iraq. 

The only open source Newsweek was able to use, to build its case (next to the unrevealed sources) was the accurate research by our colleague Evan Kohlmann. He concluded that "there are ample reasons to question whether Abu Azzam was really the No. 2 figure in the Iraqi insurgency." And he stated that according to his research "this guy was not the deputy commander of Al Qaeda." Our colleague explained that many other commanders have been described as number two or deputies in the past. And he rightly added that those who have been branded as deputies by the Jihadists haven't been captured or killed yet.

Bottom line: The US didn't get the official deputy commander of Zarqawi yet. This is very possible but here are questions to address in the game of analysis:

1) No one in al Qaida Iraq has issued an official statement yet, declaring the Bayi'a, a necessary Jihadi formality to render one particular commander as the deputy, or Nai'b. So, even as many web sites and other sources "talk" about this or other mujahid as the "man who comes after Zarqawi," it is only talk. We don't have a name yet: it's that simple

2) However, intelligence services both U.S. or Iraqis can obviously determine if one of these "emirs" is acting as the second most influential man after Zarqawi. But that is only assessment. Therefore, if a man with that profile is eliminated, it is normal to state that upon intelligence assessment, such a person has the profile of the second most powerful man. And to rebut this executive assessment - not impossible - one would have to present stronger evidence. Not a game of words about what the President said or unofficial releases by Jihadi online: we need hard evidence.

3) But beyond this Byzantine debate, let's consider few al Qaida complicated mechanisms:

a. The organization's pyramid has more than one deputy and more than one second in command. Strange but efficient.
b. The second most powerful man in the organization is not necessarily the second in command or the number two.
c. The next to take over is often "hidden" and not always chosen from the immediate entourage.
d. The head of the military committee or tanzeem is not always the head of the organization nationwide. Hence the military chief of staff is not necessarily the deputy chief on the political level, but could be as well.
e. The real hierarchy is imariya, meaning based on "emirship." So far, there is not enough information about the "emirship" not only in Iraq but throughout al Qaida worldwide.
f. Last but not least, if and when Zarqawi "goes" there would be a "legal" process to name the heir. It involves clerics, commanders, and other procedures and details.

So was the man killed by the Coalition "the" man? He certainly is one who deserves commenting and a story. But instead of thorough investigation of the "emir" place and value in the real world of Jihadism, the "story" was diverted towards the politics of the War on Terror not the actual war. Regardless of good analysis of who is really Abu Azzam, how does al Qaida functions and will this episode weaken or not the organization, the investigative effort targeted the misreading of the President. In fact the article didn't provide with neither a better reading nor another reading of the equation. For both the Administration and the "secret sources" of Newsweek agreed that the man was high up.

No one was able to determine his file number within the organization.

Another interesting argument made by the article was the criticism of US authorities for announcing several times since the war in Iraq began that key al Qaida commanders were terminated, although leaders are still in place. I don't understand the logic of the argument: For it is evident that al Qaida replaces its vanishing emirs and commanders as the conflict is evolving. I thought this was standard procedure. Unless some experts believe that al Qaida has only ten cadres, and by their vanishing the war would be over. It would be naive to think that if a number two is eliminated, his post will remain empty. Hence it is obvious that the possibility of announcing the departure of several number "2s" over the span of a conflict is very high.   

The real deal in the article is this paragraph: "The real question is whether taking any one figure out will really have an appreciable impact on an insurgency that seems to have shown a remarkable resiliency. For nearly two years now, U.S. officials have touted previous arrests or captures, most notably that of toppled leader Saddam Hussein in December 2003, as developments that would cripple the insurgency."

That is a real question: is the elimination of the Organization's head(s) the equivalent of total victory? Obviously not; no need to elaborate. Will it have an impact on the so-called insurgency? Not by itself. Would that mean that military action alone wouldn't defeat the Jihadists? True. But who said that the elimination of al Qaida field commanders and military action alone "is" the road to victory? I haven't seen such policy declaration anywhere yet. And may I add, even if some in the Administration would like to portray it as such, or if its detractors want to portray the Administration as thinking that way, the concept is wrong. In the War on Terror, we need to think complex.

There are multiple tracks, and one influences the other: military, intelligence, political, ideological, psychological and regional: For example, as I analyzed for BBC TV last night, the killing of Abu Azzam is strategically less important than the dismantling of Tal Afar networks few weeks ago. Even better, perhaps the victory on the Syrian-Iraqi border was one of the reasons for finding the al Qaida cadre. Besides, had the Iraqi Government been ready politically, these two operations could have been invested immensely in further defeating the Salafists. You don't rely on the elimination of Terror leader as the sole factor in a War on Terror but you factor it in and make sure the other pincers are moving simultaneously.

This is why I do not recommend the evaluation of the War in Iraq in simple equations: "One cadre is gone, let's look if the insurgency has weakened." It is too simplistic. Besides, the Jihadists are railing us. 

For in its conclusion, Newsweek relied on al Qaida's statement on Abu Azzam! By translating what the organization posted on the group's website, the article echoed that "Abu Azzam al-Iraqi was a soldier" in the Iraqi Al Qaeda organization. It quoted "them" ridiculing allegations by U.S. officials that Abu Azzam was the "second man" in Iraqi Al Qaeda. Citing the SITE Institute's translation Newsweek quoted the Terrorists stating that the U.S. "should stop saying that because it will not do any good." A minimal understanding of the propaganda machine of the Jihadists would have realized that "they" don't want to give any psychological victory to the infidels. From at least a significant leader in the structure, his companions reduced him to a "simple soldier among others." Just to deny Iraqis and Coalition any political victory. 

Understanding the mind of the Jihadis is crucial in the analysis of the War on Terror. As with the "flushing" affair few months ago, it is advisable to keep the big picture around when one is zooming on a point to be scored. 

— Walid Phares holds degrees in law and political science from Saint Joseph University and the Lebanese University in Beirut, a Masters in international law from the Universite de Lyons in France and a Ph.D. in international relations and strategic studies from the University of Miami.
    He has taught and lectured at numerous universities worldwide, practiced law in Beirut, and served as publisher of Sawt el-Mashreq and Mashrek International. He currently teaches Middle East political issues, ethnic and religious conflict, and comparative politics at Florida Atlantic University.
    Dr. Phares has written seven books on the Middle East and published hundreds of articles in newspapers and scholarly publications such as Global Affairs, Middle East Quarterly, and Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies. He has appeared on CNN, MSNBC, NBC, CBS, ABC, PBS, and BBC as well as on radio broadcasts.
    Aside from serving on the boards of several national and international think tanks and human rights associations, Dr. Phares has testified before the US Senate Subcommittee on the Middle East and South East Asia and regularly conducts congressional and State Department briefings.
    Dr. Phares is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C.

Visit Dr. Phares on the web at walidphares.com and defenddemocracy.org.

© 2005 Walid Phares

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