Published 21 May 08

Hezbollah's Communication Network Confirms Its Terror Goals

by Walid Phares, Ph.D.
World Defense Review columnist

An intelligence map released by a French web site, referencing Lebanese sources, shows the extensive communications network established by Hezbollah throughout Lebanon. These closed telephone circuits are operationally independent of government networks. The Lebanese Ministry of Telecommunications has no link to these closed cable-based networks. These systems were at the heart of the latest confrontation between the Seniora cabinet and Hezbollah commander Hassan Nasrallah. The latter accused the government of attempting to seize these networks or supervising them, and the Lebanese government naturally stating that all telephonic networks in Lebanon, as in any country, must be under the auspices of the legal government. Hezbollah rejected this "normal" status and responded that since it perceives itself as a "resistance" therefore it can and should have its own "closed communications system." In other words, a state within the state.

The Lebanese government, operating under Lebanon's constitution, and under the auspices of UNSCR 1701 and 1559 declared - but didn't even act upon its declaration - that these telecommunication systems were not under government authority and thus must be integrated. This was a basic state of fact. But as soon as these ministerial decisions were publicized Hezbollah waged a blitz campaign on the Lebanese government. Even though the latter wasn't even ready to dismantle these networks nor did it have the necessary means to confront Hezbollah militarily, Secretary General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah held a press conference, declared war against the government, and gave the signal to the coup.

Why would Hezbollah wage such a risky war for a telecommunication system? Is it because of the income generated by these networks, used also to sell international phone calls? Less likely. The Iranian foreign aid to the terror group was upgraded from 300 million dollars to less than a billion dollars few months ago. Obviously more revenue isn't bad for the leaders of the so-called "resistance" but more important is the big picture revealed by the Hezbollah-phone map. Look at the web of cable (in red) on the map below and let's analyze this.

Map A: Hezbollah Telecommunications System

The "Red Lines" stretch from southern Beirut along the coast to the Hezbollah exclusive zones in the south. They cover a complex network of bases in the area, cut through the Jezzine district and connect with the Bekaa valley all the way up to northern Lebanon. The most important features and dimensions of the Hezb-net are the following:

1. The net covers large parts of Greater Beirut: This can provide Hezbollah with the ability of organizing its forces in Dahiye (southern suburb of Beirut) for assaults against West Beirut, East Beirut and the Druze Mountain in Aley and the Shuf. The closed circuit can mobilize thousands of fighters without interception from Lebanese or international monitoring. It explains how Hezbollah launched its blitzkrieg offensive on Sunni Beirut, the Druze Mountain and was testing Christian Beirut, without real warning to the areas under attack.

2. The coastal cable-line links the Dahiye to the inner land of the Hezb. It serves to move troops and material from the south to the north without major detection. It explains how thousands of Hezbollah forces were moved from as far as Nabatieh and Tyre to Beirut. But it also tells about the capacity of Hezbollah to use it against UNIFIL forces in the future, if needed.

3. The network between the south and the Bekaa indicates the strategy of Hezbollah to close the gap to the East. As I have indicated in many articles and interviews previously, the Lebanese-Syrian borders are what counts to Hezbollah's Terror network. As long as these frontiers are open for Iran to supply weapons and logistics via Syria, the state within the state can thrive and grow. The Lebanese government and the UN, with European and US backing should have closed that gap three years ago, but they didn't. Let's leave the blame game to another discussion. Hezbollah was faster than any one else. According to this map the Iranian backed militia built an impressive network throughout East Lebanon from the southern fortresses to the closest position to the northern borders with Syria. This means that Hezbollah, by now, has covered the entire Bekaa valley, and thus has beaten the international community to the borders with Syria. Military and intelligence analysts can understand this development very clearly. Strategically, Hezbollah is in control of these areas as shown by Map B which I established two years ago.

Map B: Hezbollah Strategic Control Areas

4. In the mid Bekaa, the cable-route connects the center of the valley to one of the highest peaks in Mount Lebanon and - as Map A shows - thrusts into the mostly Christian districts of Byblos and Kesruan. This shows that Hezbollah has already established an axis of penetration inside the Mount Lebanon area, at few kilometers only from the sea shore.

5. Map A also shows that Hezbollah positions are connected to the Anti-Lebanon range and thus to the Syrian hinterland. Militarily there are no Lebanese-Syrian borders to stop the flow of weapons and forces coming from Iran through Syria into Lebanon.

6. The northern tips of the Hezbollah "cable road" shows clearly that its forces are deployed as far north as the Eastern slopes of the Cedars Mounts. From these positions, the Iranian-backed forces can seize the highest peak south of Turkey, leap to the Akkar district, and reach the northern borders with Syria.

7. More importantly, and because of the strategic bridge between Hezbollah and Iran, this communications network is a battlefield system which can be used by the Iranian Pasdaran and eventually by Syrian special forces in a potential mass return to Lebanon. During the summer of 2007, I presented the following projection-map in a briefing to the Caucus on Counter Terrorism at the US House of Representatives, as well as to a number of high-ranking US military officers. It shows the potential paths of a Hezbollah offensive in Lebanon.

Indeed, strategic projections show that Hezbollah can move its forces from the south towards Beirut (which was executed in May). But it also shows that combined forces of Hezbollah and Pasdaran can move on the Damascus road to Beirut and Mount Lebanon and to the center of the mountain as well. Hezbollah-Pasdaran forces would move in the north on an East-West axis and Jihadist elements and pro-Syrian forces can move from the borders to Tripoli. The Hezbollah communication systems shows that when time will come, massive reinforcement from Syria and Iran can move swiftly along axis already secured by Hezbollah across Lebanon. The invasion of West Beirut and the attacks against the Shuf and Aley districts are only the early signs of what is to come.

8. Last, but not least, the Hezbollah communications network can also allow an activation of their massive Rockets and Missiles system across Lebanon without significant interference from Western assets. The aim of this powerful missile force seems to be against a potential "international" force tasked with the mission of bringing peace to the country. Here again Hezbollah - and Iran - has already beaten the West in the race towards dominating the Eastern Mediterranean.

— Dr. Walid Phares is Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, D.C., and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels. He is the author of the recently released book, The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad; and of Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West (2006) and The War of Ideas: Terrorist Strategies against the West (2007), available at www.walidphares.com.
    Dr. Phares holds degrees in law and political science from Saint Joseph University and the Lebanese University in Beirut, a Masters in international law from the Universite de Lyons in France and a Ph.D. in international relations and strategic studies from the University of Miami.
    He has taught and lectured at numerous universities worldwide, practiced law in Beirut, and served as publisher of Sawt el-Mashreq and Mashrek International. He has taught Middle East political issues, ethnic and religious conflict, and comparative politics at Florida Atlantic University until 2006. He has been teaching Jihadi strategies at the National Defense University since 2007.
    Dr. Phares has written eight books on the Middle East and published hundreds of articles in newspapers and scholarly publications such as Global Affairs, Middle East Quarterly, the Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies and the Journal of International Security. He has appeared on CNN, MSNBC, Fox News, NBC, CBS, ABC, PBS, BBC, al Jazeera, al Hurra, al Arabiya, as well as on many radio broadcasts.
    Aside from serving on the boards of several national and international think tanks and human rights associations, Dr. Phares has testified before the US Senate Subcommittees on the Middle East and South East Asia, the House Committees on International Relations and Homeland Security and regularly conducts congressional and State Department as well as European Parliament and UN Security Council briefings.

Visit Dr. Phares on the web at walidphares.com and defenddemocracy.org.

© 2008 Walid Phares

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