Published 03 Mar 08

Pakistan's Elections and the Global War on Terrorism

by Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, (Pakistan Air Force, ret.)
World Defense Review columnist

Never has an outcome of any general elections in Pakistan evoked as much international interest as that of 2008: The primary reason being the concern and uncertainty over how the new political leadership in Islamabad would view its support for the U.S./NATO forces operating in Afghanistan.

Now that the election results are known – and coalition-forming activities are in full swing – it is time to analyze what could be future Pakistani government policy regarding the Global War on Terrorism.

One of the most significant outcomes of the elections has been the marginalization of the religious political parties which had gained tremendously during the 2002 elections by capitalizing on anti-U.S. sentiment that had swept the country in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. This led to these parties forming governments in both Pakistani provinces bordering Afghanistan – Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Because of the religious leaning of these governments, the religious extremists operating from the border regions of these two provinces enjoyed a significant respite allowing them to regroup and intensify their activities.

With the religious parties having lost out to the secular and liberal political elements in these provinces, the freedom with which they were earlier functioning is now bound to be restricted, and this should be a welcome development for the U.S./ NATO forces inside Afghanistan.

The most probable coalition that appears to be emerging in Pakistan sees the late Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People Party (PPP) joining hands with Nawaz Sharif's faction of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) and Asfandyar Wali's Awami National Party (ANP) since the latter has emerged as a major political force in the NWFP.

Interestingly, all these parties project a centrist, secular and liberal outlook which is expected to define their policies. Even if a coalition is formed between these three parties, the ANP would remain the key player in the NWFP. It is the party which has won the maximum seats in the NWFP Assembly, so it will get to appoint the chief minister; its power base lies in the NWFP; almost all of its leaders are Pushtu speaking Pathans like the natives of Pakistan's Tribal Areas who are supposedly providing a safe haven to the Taleban and Al Qaeda elements therein and it also has a sizeable presence in the Federal legislature.

Since the 2008 elections have been a virtual negation of President Pervez Musharraf's policy of unstinting support for the U.S./ NATO military operations in Afghanistan, it is reasonable to expect that the new regime would tend to move away from the stance that has been maintained by Musharraf. This could result in a gradual withdrawal of the Pakistan military from the tribal areas with the emphasis shifting toward achieving a negotiated settlement rather than trying for one through the employment of military force. In the same vein, the freedom with which the U.S./NATO forces have earlier been permitted to operate against the militants in Pakistan's border belt might also be restricted. The danger in the implementation of both these actions for the war in Afghanistan is self-evident and needs to be taken into account by the U.S. and NATO leadership.

Since the use of extensive military force against the militant extremist elements in the tribal areas is not expected to be looked upon favorably by the new Pakistani government in Islamabad as well as the provincial regime in Peshawar, U.S. and NATO commanders must consider adopting a different strategy from the one they are currently pursuing. It is vital that in order to ensure Pakistan's continuing support, the new strategy should be in line with the thinking of Pakistan's political leadership and must rely more on the non-overt use of military force.

The basic purpose of the Pakistani – as well as coalition – forces fighting in Afghanistan is to control the movement of militants across the porous Durand Line that divides Pakistan and Afghanistan. Not only do the militants have bases in Pakistan's tribal areas (FATA) but they also cross-over when being pursued by U.S./NATO forces since the FATA provides them refuge and a safe haven. In view of this common goal, the most effective non-hostile and non-military means available would be to seal the Pakistan-Afghanistan border completely.

In the implementation of this strategy, coalition forces should plug the exits from Afghanistan into Pakistan with the Pakistan Army doing the same from the other side.

This non-military measure would not only be beneficial for coalition forces but would also be acceptable to the new political regimes in Islamabad and Peshawar.

Gradually, however, the regular Pakistan Army elements should be withdrawn from the area with the responsibility being taken over by the paramilitary Frontier Corps. The Pakistan Army units returning from the tribal areas must, however, be garrisoned in the nearby settled areas adjacent to the tribal belt so that they may be deployed if any serious situation develops. After all, the militants – being denied passage to Afghanistan – are liable to turn around and begin focusing on Pakistan itself.

In order to deny any respite to the militants, coalition forces and the Pakistan military must get together to implement this strategy as soon as possible.

Due to the impassable and rugged nature of the border terrain, even the undesirable step of mining some of the possible crossing routes should be considered to deter and hinder the cross-border movement of the militants between Pakistan and Afghanistan. By implementing this strategy, the new regime in Islamabad could continue to support the Global War on Terrorism while appearing to adopt a policy that is less reliant on the use of military force.

Another advantage of sealing of the border would be the hindrance that such a move would create for the drugs smugglers who use this route for moving drugs from Afghanistan into Pakistan and beyond.

— Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf (Pakistan Air Force, ret.) writes about aerospace, defense, international terrorism, and nuclear proliferation with a focus on South Asia.

Ashraf currently holds an MA in Defence and Strategic Studies, and is pursuing an advanced degree in International Policy and Diplomacy.

As a retired senior officer in Pakistan's Air Force – rising to the rank of air commodore (equivalent to brigadier general) – Ashraf's assignments have included assistant chief of staff (air operations) during the 2001–2002 standoff with India, a faculty member at Pakistan's National Defence College, and Pakistan's Defence Attache to Indonesia, Australia, Singapore, and South Korea.

Ashraf is the author of Aerospace Power: The Emerging Strategic Dimension, co-author of The Role of Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia, and he has written more than 70 articles and papers for professional military journals in Pakistan, India, and the U.S.

© 2008 Tariq Mahmud Ashraf

NOTE: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the opinions of World Defense Review and its affiliates. WDR accepts no responsibility whatsoever for the accuracy or inaccuracy of the content of this or any other story published on this website. Copyright and all rights for this story (and all other stories by the author) are held by the author.

——

Also by Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf:
• The Impact of Pakistan-China defense ties on the War on Terrorism [01 May 08]
• Pakistan's Elections and the Global War on Terrorism [03 Mar 08]
• Pakistan's 'Mother of All Elections': Domestic and International Implications [21 Feb 08]