Published 21 Feb 08
Pakistan's 'Mother of All Elections': Domestic and International Implications
by Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, (Pakistan Air Force, ret.)
World Defense Review columnist
Three points must be made regarding the long-awaited elections in Pakistan, which were held Monday, Feb. 18:
- First, despite most predictions that Pres. Pervez Musharraf would again find some excuse to postpone the elections, the voting did take place.
- Second and notwithstanding the loss of 27 lives in disturbances on election day there was no major terrorist activity.
- And lastly, most observers agree the elections were free, transparent, and fair.
The results available at the time of this writing follow:
Party National Assembly Punjab Sindh Baluch NWFP Pakistan People's Party 87 78 65 7 17 Nawaz Muslim League (Nawaz) 66 101 0 0 5 Quaid Muslim League (Quaid) 38 66 9 17 6 Muttahida Qaumi Movement 19 0 38 0 0 Awami National Party 10 0 2 1 31 Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal 3 2 0 6 9 Functional Muslim League 4 3 7 0 0 Baluchistan National Party 1 0 0 5 0 Sherpao Peoples Party 1 0 0 0 5 National People's Party 2 0 3 0 0 Independents 27 35 1 10 18 TOTAL RESULTS FINALIZED 258 285 125 46 91 TOTAL SEATS CONTESTED 268 293 130 51 96 Table: Pakistan Election 2008 Results
DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS
Complete Rout of Religious Political Alliance
Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the religious political parties in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the southwest province of Baluchistan, took advantage of anti-America sentiment and swept the elections in 2002. They formed governments in those provinces and established a sizeable presence in the federal legislature. The 2008 results have corrected this phenomenon with the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) losing comprehensively to secular political players.
This reversal is not because of goodwill for the U.S., but is due to the failure of the MMA in ensuring good governance. The emergence of secular political leaders indicates an end to the freedom available to the religious extremists and also strengthens the belief that the Pakistani people neither favor religious extremism nor condone it.
Defeat of Musharraf's Political Allies
Musharraf's political stature has slumped after the imposition of "emergency," sacking of the judiciary and Benazir Bhutto's assassination. This election has proved how strongly the voters view his actions.
The Pakistan Muslim LeagueQ fared poorly in these elections with 22 members of the previous cabinet failing to get re-elected. This indicates the displeasure of the Pakistani masses with Musharraf and his cronies.
The 'Provincial' Element in Pakistan's Politics
The 2008 elections have demonstrated how provincialism influences Pakistani politics: the Pakistani People's Party swept Sindh; PMLN won in Punjab; and the Awami National Party in the NWFP.
Most political parties have secured seats only in one province; a few are present in two provinces while only the PPP and PMLQ are represented in all four provinces.
The conviction and belief of the common Pakistanis in the unity of the Federation has been borne out thus:
- Despite being a Sindh-based party, the PPP has a strong presence in the Punjab.
- The PML-Q, with a Punjab base, has a strong presence in Baluchistan, allaying fears of this province nearing a civil war/secession.
Impact of Bhutto's Assassination
Although apprehensions remain regarding Bhutto-widower Asif Ali Zardari's abilities to manage his wife's legacy, the people of Pakistan have been swayed by the sympathy factor after Bhutto's assassination.
Split Mandates and Coalitions
No political party has won enough seats to form a government on its own anywhere except for the PPP, which can form its own government in Sindh. This implies the following:
- In Islamabad, political parties will have to come together to establish a government. In attempts to place its own PM, the PPP would need to make accommodations with other political parties.
- In Karachi, the ability of the PPP to form a government on its own would sideline the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, which happens to dominate the city government.
Future of Pres. Musharraf
Musharraf is treading on thin ice in dealing with an overtly hostile political regime. He needs to block their efforts to reinstate the Judiciary and restore the Constitution. Although Musharraf possesses the power to dissolve the elected legislatures, an exercise of this power will put the country into serious turmoil.
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Pakistan's Continued Involvement in the Global War on Terrorism
Unlike the Musharraf regime, a political dispensation might find it difficult to fully support the U.S. While it would want to eradicate religious militancy, the new government is less likely to embark on an open conflict against the Taliban. This would be a blow to U.S./NATO military operations inside Afghanistan.
The emergence of a liberal government in the NWFP is a positive sign since this government would work towards eradicating the militant Islamic elements from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Such a move will restrict the freedom with which these elements travel between Afghanistan and Pakistan and further the cause of the U.S./NATO forces
The policy of the future Pakistani government toward the War on Terror would be influenced by the preference of the newly elected leaders for tackling Islamic militants not through military force but through negotiation.
Relations with India
Democratic governments in Pakistan have been more amenable to improving relations with India and the Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue could be revived.
Life without Musharraf
Rather than banking on Musharraf for support, the West needs to establish links with the new political leadership.
U.S./NATO forces could implement a border sealing operation jointly with the Pakistan security forces to squeeze the militants from both sides.
U.S./NATO must suitably equip and train Pakistan's Frontier Corps, which undertakes security operations within the FATA.
CONCLUSION
It took more than eight years of for Pakistan's transition to democracy through the country's ninth elections and the results are an indictment against Musharraf, his political cronies, and their policies.
While Pakistan's elected leadership must tackle the domestic implications, the U.S. and NATO would have to contend with a regime, which, perhaps, would be more eager negotiate with the Islamic militants rather than taking them on militarily. Such pacification measures might not work. Moreover, those measures might serve to provide the militants with (for them) a much-needed respite, enabling the militants to recoup and regroup after they had been substantially weakened by recent military offensives against them.
Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf (Pakistan Air Force, ret.) writes about aerospace, defense, international terrorism, and nuclear proliferation with a focus on South Asia.
Ashraf currently holds an MA in Defence and Strategic Studies, and is pursuing an advanced degree in International Policy and Diplomacy.
As a retired senior officer in Pakistan's Air Force rising to the rank of air commodore (equivalent to brigadier general) Ashraf's assignments have included assistant chief of staff (air operations) during the 20012002 standoff with India, a faculty member at Pakistan's National Defence College, and Pakistan's Defence Attache to Indonesia, Australia, Singapore, and South Korea.
Ashraf is the author of Aerospace Power: The Emerging Strategic Dimension, co-author of The Role of Transparency in Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia, and he has written more than 70 articles and papers for professional military journals in Pakistan, India, and the U.S.
© 2008 Tariq Mahmud Ashraf
NOTE: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the opinions of World Defense Review and its affiliates. WDR accepts no responsibility whatsoever for the accuracy or inaccuracy of the content of this or any other story published on this website. Copyright and all rights for this story (and all other stories by the author) are held by the author.
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